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[DECEMBER with a varied set of theoretical predictions. Many decision rules are considered, and a number of different approaches are used to predict how the respondents should have behaved in the experiments if they had used a particular rule.
In the first section we review the experimental method and the key results. In the second major section, we turn to utility-based models. The nature of the experiment discussed here restricts tests of the utility-based models to questions concerning the shape and intertemporal stability of the utility function. Thus we will look at the way various measures of risk aversion behave as wealth and gain levels change. We will examine an empirical test of the asset integration hypothesis, by which that hypothesis is rejected. For a discussion of the asset integration hypothesis, see Kahneman and Tversky (I979) .
Safety-based models of behaviour are considered in the third section of the paper. It is shown that predicting behaviour with these supposedly simple rules is often not straightforward. Furthermore, the predictions derived with these models are seen to be inconsistent with the experimental behaviour reported. The final section of the paper provides a discussion of the study's results.
I. THE EXPERIMENT AND THE KEY RESULTS
The experiment makes no theoretical restrictions; individuals choose among alternatives in which an increase in expected returns can be purchased only by increasing risk or the dispersion of outcomes. Unlike most of the studies to date in psychology and economics, this experiment used pay-offs that were both real and large to induce participants to reveal their preferences. Indeed, the highest expected payoff for a single decision exceeded the average monthly income of an unskilled worker. The subjects of the study were 330 individuals selected at random from six villages of the semi-arid tracts of Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh.' The experiment itself consisted of a sequence of games, with real and high pay-offs, that were played in the following way: People were offered a set of eight choice alternatives in which high expected returns could be purchased only for a large standard deviation. Alternatives A to F are described in the top panel of Table  I . Each consists of a 'good luck' and a 'bad luck' outcome and its probability, of 1/2, is decided on the toss of a coin. Alternative 0 provides a fixed and certain outcome: The individual is simply paid Rs. 50. Alternative F pays nothing or Rs. 200 with equal probability. A risk averse individual would prefer alternatives B to B*, C to C*, and E to F, since each pair of alternatives has the same expected value but B*, C*, and F each have higher spreads than B, C, and E, respectively. (The moves from B to B*, C to C*, and E to F are therefore what Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) , have called mean-preserving spreads.) Only the alternatives shown in Table I were available for choice. Each alternative was labelled (column heads in Table I ) to indicate the degree or risk aversion its choice by a subject represented. These labels were arbitrary and were not revealed to the respondents. More precise measures of risk aversion are discussed later.
The game was played -and pay-offs were actually made -seven or eight times over a period of six weeks or more, and between one day's and two weeks' time was allowed between games for reflection. Respondents did not know in advance how many times the games would be played or at what level. In the first 5 games all amounts shown in Panel I of Table I were divided by IOO; that is, alternative F paid Rs. 2 on good luck, whereas alternative 0 paid Rs. 0.50 consistently. This set of 5 games was called the Rs. o.5o game level. At least two weeks later two games were played at the Rs. 5 level (all amounts in panel I divided by I o). After two more weeks a subsample of I I8 household heads played the Rs. 50 game and it is only the results for this subsample that are shown in panel II (see Table I , footnote t on sample size variations). Chi-square tests showed that at the Rs. 5 level the risk-aversion distribution of the subsample whose results are discussed here could not be distinguished statistically from the risk-aversion distribution of the other household heads or of the latter's wives, who did not play the Rs. 50 game. Finally, two weeks after the Rs. 50 game, respondents were asked hypothetical questions about how they would behave at the Rs. 500 level. Although we show the results for this hypothetical question, we do not use the answers at that level of payoff in the tests performed in this paper. ' The The basic purpose of all utility models is to associate with each action or prospect aj a unique utility value U. such that a decision maker will choose a, over a2 (a1 > a2) if, and only if, the utility value of a, exceeds the utility value of a2 or is equal to it,2 that is a, > a2 U(al) _ U(a2),
where > indicates a relationship of preference or indifference. The outcome of each action depends on which event Ei will occur. In all formulations, the decision maker is assumed to associate objective probabilities or subjective probabilities (or decision weights) with each event Ei. Furthermore, the action aj associates an outcome (usually money income or wealth) with each event Ei. For simplicity, the discussion that follows will be restricted to discrete probability distributions. All the theories share the utility function structure,
i where rri is a 'probability' measure in either an objective or subjective sense. Note that in this formulation utility and probability combine multiplicatively for each individual event and that these products are summed over the set of events. Tversky (I967) has tested this basic formulation experimentally for a large class of more specific models that can be derived from equation (2) and has found his experimental results to be consistent with additivity of the utility contributions of each possible event.
In the expected income (EI) model the utility function is linear, and objective probabilities Pi are used as decision weights, that is, U, = YiPiXi. In the expected utility (EU) model, for which Von Neumann and Morgenstern (I947) provided underlying axioms, a utility function, which is typically assumed to be concave, is used to weight outcomes, that is, U2 = Y2P1 U(X1).
In the subjective expected utility (SEU) model associated with Ramsey (I93I) and Savage (I954), objective probabilities are replaced by subjective probabilities HIj to form the utility index U3 = Ei HI U(Xi). This is the model preferred by economists. The mathematical psychology literature has attempted to make subjective probabilities a direct and, as the authors hope, unique function of objective probabilities by writing HIj = h(Pi).
The ( 7) 1 This is not the place to discuss the probability preference literature, but attempts to measure such preferences practically stopped after it proved difficult to find stable functions. Such measurements have been attempted by Preston and Baratta (I948), Griffith (I964), Sprowls (1953), Edwards (I953, 1954) and others. Theoretical problems associated with stable functions were first noted by Edwards (I955), who as a consequence developed the non-additive subjective expected utility (NASEU) model. 2 The subjective expected income approach is in fact rejected by a direct contradiction of one of its basic axioms which Handa (1977) postulated. This axiom (called enhanced prospects by Handa) says that the ranking of bets should be unaffected by the multiplicative transformation of all of their outcomes by the same constant that is used in the experiment discussed here. In a sense it does not rule out risk aversion, but it does assume what amounts to constant partial risk aversion. Handa is uneasy about this assumption but defends it by saying that it may hold for games in the neighbourhood of normal business transactions. But normal business transactions of the households considered clearly include all payoff sizes from thc 0o50 to the 5oo rupees game. And the ordering of prospects changes for most individuals within that range. 
In fact, once Q, o and M are known, all three can be computed. Since Q can be computed both from a utility function in terms of net gains and from one in terms of wealth, it does not matter for measurement purposes with which specification one starts. The three measures have the following interpretation. Consider the prospect (X, P) where X and P are vectors. Note that prospects here are defined in terms of gains and losses from whatever initial wealth may happen to be. Absolute risk aversion traces the behaviour of individuals to the prospect (X, P), as their wealth rises and the prospect remains the same. We usually assume decreasing absolute risk aversion, which implies that an individual's willingness to accept a given fair gamble should rise as wealth rises.
Relative risk aversion traces the behaviour of an individual as both wealth and the size of the prospect (X, P) rise. Let k be a scalar. Consider the individual in a new position in which he or she now owns wealth kW and is confronted with the prospect (kX, P). Arrow (I 97 I) hypothesised increasing relative risk aversion, which implies that an individual's willingness to accept a given gamble decreases when both wealth and all outcomes of a gamble are multiplied by the same constant.
Partial risk aversion traces the behaviour of an individual when the scale of the prospect changes by a factor k but wealth remains the same. Increasing partial risk aversion implies a decrease in the willingness of the individual to take a gamble as the scale of the prospect increases.
Menezes and Hanson have also shown (for an individual who has nonzero wealth and who is risk averse) that if partial risk aversion is monotonic in k, then it must be constant or increasing with an increase in prospect size k. Note that in the experiment under discussion, prospect size was varied by a factor of ioo but wealth was left virtually constant.' Menezes and Hanson would therefore predict a leftward shift of the distribution of risk aversion as game scale rises. This result is confirmed in Table I and is statistically significant.
To measure risk aversion coefficients, therefore, one should use a utility function that exhibits increasing partial risk aversion (IPRA). Such a function is discussed in Binswanger (I978) and Sillers (I980). However, the function has the disadvantage that its parameters must be estimated from the observed choices that an individual has made at two game levels. Panels IV and V of Table I illustrate the behaviour of the absolute and relative risk aversion coefficients. The number assigned to each alternative at each game level is a separate local approximation under the assumption of a utility function with constant partial risk aversion in the neighbourhood of the payoff levels involved in the alternative. The numbers in panel IV and V have to be viewed in conjunction with the frequency distribution of the choices in Table  i and with the geometric means of absolute risk aversion that were computed from the distribution of choices. These geometric means (see right-hand side of panel IV, On the other hand, contrary to Arrow's (I97I) prediction, relative risk aversion is also declining. The numbers computed in panel V refer to an individual with a wealth of Rs. Io,ooo, somewhat less than the modal wealth. However, for wealth levels in excess of Rs. Io,ooo the qualitative conclusion discussed below holds: With the exception of overall risk neutrality -that is, of a choice pattern of alternative E or F at all game levels -relative risk aversion of the sample households must be declining. In particular, for the 'average' choice pattern the following is the case. At the Rs. 0o50 level the average absolute risk aversion coefficient places the centre of the distribution between choices C and E. The centre shifts to choice B at the Rs. 500 level. Thus on average, relative risk aversion declines from an order of 03 to an order of o-oooi.
Arrow's prediction of rising relative risk aversion arises out of the following assumptions: If the utility function is bounded from below as wealth approaches zero, R cannot approach a limit above one as wealth tends to zero. On the other hand, if the utility function is bounded from above, R cannot approach a limit below one as wealth approaches infinity. Therefore, if one makes the further 1 For indifference points AB, BC CE the differences in S were less than 2 %, using the two functions. For the indifference point OA the differences were up to I 5 % but even that percentage would not affect the qualitative results reported below, particularly because so few individuals choose alternative 0, and regression results were quite stable relative to functional transformation of risk aversion measures. For details, see Binswanger (1978) or Sillers (I980).
2 Equation (7) implies that on a constant partial risk aversion function (S/aM = o) absolute risk aversion must be declining for positive M. However, we use the CPRA function only to get a local approximation of S for each alternative at each game level, and as the footnote above implies, these approximations are close. The conclusion, on the other hand, is derived from the behaviour of the geometric average of these approximate levels across game scales and is not sensitive to the minor approximation errors involved. 
The Concept of Asset Integration and Measures of Risk Aversion
In using the concept of utility function, economists have usually chosen to express utility as a function of wealth W, that is, U = U(W)= U(cO +M). Examining axiomatic treatments of the subjective expected utility model (see, for example, Arrow, I97I), one can see clearly that, since the theory is timeless, the set of axioms used does not imply.that the utility fiunction is stable over time in terms of wealth. All consistency and transitivity axioms are specified in terms of the properties of a preference ordering over prospects or actions of the form (X, P), where X is a vector of outcomes and P a vector of probabilities.
One can always add co or any other constant to all X's for all prospects and obtain among them the same preference ordering with consistency and transitivity properties. Furthermore, the axioms are all about consistency of decisions over a set of prospects available now. To obtain a stable utility function in wealth we must make an additional assumption of invariance of the utility function (not This assumption has usually crept in by the back door of convenience rather than being made explicit. One way to test whether utility functions should be specified as stable in terms of wealth or in terms of gains and losses is to inspect measured utility functions for wiggles around zero gain and loss or for relatively larger or lower risk aversion around that point than at other points. In an intuitive sense, the observation that risk aversion varies in systematic ways and much more rapidly with payoff size than with respect to equivalent wealth changes across individuals would tend to support the concept of a utility function in terms of gains and losses rather than wealth.
On the vertical axis of (By taking the derivative of equation (5), we can also see clearly that the behaviour of the relative risk aversion coefficient is the same with respect to net gain and initial wealth.) Equation (I 3) is a testable implication of the assumption of asset integration and must be fulfilled for stable utility functions in terms of wealth. (Under asset integration) it implies that absolute (and relative.)risk aversion changes at approximately the same rate with changes in gains as with changes in wealth. We will test this implication later. But for now note that the behaviour of partial risk aversion is not the same with respect to gains as with respect to initial wealth: Although AQ/AM can be derived by observing the reaction of a group of individuals to income gains through the game, the measure of AQ/Aw, must be estimated by means of regression from cross section data. Such regressions, and all variables entering them, are discussed in Binswanger (i980). However, the specification of the regressions and of the variables has been improved in the following ways:
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In contrast to the variables of the earlier study, wealth and schooling are assumed to be endogenous variables, dependent on the level of risk aversion. A two-stage least-squares regression of risk aversion (ln S) at the Rs. 5 level is therefore reported in Table 2 , where predicted wealth and schooling variables from a first-stage regression (not shown) are used as independent variables. The full model, consisting of three equations, is precisely identified: the variable 'luck' enters the risk aversion equation but not the schooling or wealth equations; inherited wealth (measured by the current value of inherited land) enters only the wealth equation; and father's schooling enters only the education equation. Again in contrast with the earlier study, in the present study we have collected complete data on wealth and debts and use net wealth rather than gross wealth. Finally, the variable 'caste rank' now reflects not only the rank of a caste relative to the other castes but also the number of individuals in castes below or above the caste considered.2 From a In Q/l In 0) = -o03 I88. To be entirely on the safe side, i.e. in favour of asset integration, we increase the (absolute) value of this coefficient by twice its standard error to -o9628. We can now use this coefficient to estimate the proportional increase in wealth that would be required to get the same change AQ as the increase in M of 40 that is, the wealth of the average individual must rise by nearly 8o % to achieve the same increase in risk aversion; Since modal wealth is roughly Rs. 13,000, an increase of more than Rs. io,ooo is required under the most favourable assumption to shift the risk aversion distribution by as much as is achieved, for certain gains, by an increase of less than Rs. ioo. This implies that aQ/lM is more than ioo times the value of Q/1&), and the assumption of asset integration must be rejected. One objection to this test is that the coefficient of wealth is measured from the cross-sectional variation of absolute risk aversion across the households, whereas the difference caused by the change in game level is simply the difference in the geometric average of absolute risk aversion for the same individuals (1979) has recently reviewed these rules, and it is his exposition that we will follow here. The advocates of safety-based rules of thumb usually propose these rules on the following grounds: (i) relative to utility-based models, they simplify the calculations the individual must make in order to decide among a set of alternative actions; and (2) they offer a more realistic description of the individual's decision-making process than do utility-based models. Very rarely, however, do the proponents consider the information requirement of the analyst who attempts to make predictions for an individual or a group of individuals. How much does the analyst have to know about individual's tastes, opportunity sets, and constraint sets ? As we shall see, the distinction between the analyst's and the individual's information requirement is particularly important for safetybased rules. Individuals will usually know their subsistence needs, but an analyst may have to elicit information about these needs in order to make predictions. The same holds for other elements of individuals' tastes and constraints. Therefore, in addition to criteria (i) and (2), we will focus in this section on the analyst's information requirement.
Just as utility functions can be written in terms of net gains or in terms of wealth, so safety-based rules can be defined in terms of gains and losses arising from a simple prospect, or in terms of final income, which is the sum of the initial income stream and the net.gain from the new prospect (income integration). In so far as income is the rate of return to an individual's physical and human capital, income and asset integration are identical concepts. Safetybased predictions differ sharply, depending on whether or not income integration is assumed, and it will be shown that the analyst requires much more information to derive predictions when income integration is assumed than when it is not. It should also be noted that targets for gains and losses arising from a specific set of prospects such as the experiment cannot be justified on the basis of subsistence incomes or physiological need considerations. Such concepts must be defined over total income, since gains from different sources are fungible in meeting these targets. Gain and loss targets would be appropriate only if individuals wanted to use gains from specific sets of prospects to purchase a desired good over and above some 'normal' expenditure level (for example, purchasing consumer durables, taking a trip).
Four rules are described in Table 3 . They are written out in gain and loss form. The income-integrated form simply substitutes income I and income tar- Table 3 , row 6). Thus the rules will be discussed in gain and loss form only. Safety-fixed Rule (Table 3 ,, row I). The individual is assumed to choose the prospect that maximises the minimum gain d achievable with a fixed probability (i -P*). P* is the target probability of disaster. When P* is equal to zero, the rule is called Maximin, meaning maximise the minimum gain.
Safety Principle Rule (Table 3 , row 2). Instead of being concerned largely with the target probability, here the individual is assumed to be most interested in a target gain level d* and to choose the prospect that will maximise tne probability that the actual gain will exceed the target or disaster gain level d*. Table 3, rows 3 and 4) . Roumasset (I973) has proposed two lexicographic rules that are designed to sharpen the predictions. These rules operate with both a fixed probability target and a fixed gain (income) target and assume that the individual first wants to satisfy the safety constraint in row 5. This constraint says that the individual will only want to accept alternatives that give him or her a target gain d* with a fixed target probability ( P*).
Lexicographic Rules (LSF) (
When the constraint is satisfied, the individual will choose the alternative that maximises the expected gain (or income); that is, the rules break ties between those alternatives that satisfy the safety constraint.
LSF-2 and LSF-i differ only in their predictions of what the individual will do when none of the alternatives satisfies the safety constraint. Under LSF-2, the individual will behave in the safety-fixed fashion; under LSF-i, the individual will behave according to the safety principle.
Predictions with Gain and Loss Targets
In what follows we will consider predictions only for probability target P* of less than I /2, since proponents of such rules would surely not have thought of disaster probability targets greater than that.
It is clear from inspecting the set of experimental payoffs in panel I of Table I  that any decision maker using the safety fixed rule (Table 3 , row I) must choose alternative zero at all game levels since that results in the highest bad luck income for any P* in the interval o < P* < I/2. In panel II of Table I we see that at best 2-5 % of individuals have chosen alternative zero; the safetyfixed rule therefore does not describe observed behaviour.
The other three rules in Table 3 are tested as follows. In conjunction with an observed distribution of choices, each rule implies restrictions on the distribution of target incomes among the respondents. For example, only a limited range of target incomes may be consistent with the observed choices. Since the games have been played at several levels, the distribution of choices at each level can be used to derive independent predictions about the distribution of target gains. If these predictions are inconsistent across game scales, the majority of individuals cannot have behaved according to the decision rule used to derive the predictions.
The left-hand column of Table 4 lists 3I ranges of target gains. These ranges span the potential gains achievable in the experiment. Columns (I)- (4) give the set of choices an individual can make, following either of the two rules indicated. Alternatives included in the choice sets are preferred to every excluded alternative, and the decision maker is indifferent among all alternatives included in a set. We assume also that indifference implies random choice; that is, each alternative included in the set has an equal probability of being selected. Without this assumption of indifference, we could make few predictions about distributions of target incomes.
The safety principle implies no prediction wlhenever the target gain cannot Table 4 ). The distribution of the target gains should be highly concentrated in that range. However, concentration of d* in the 0.50 < d* < 2.00 range implies equal probability of choice between alternatives 0, A, B, C, and E at the Rs. 50 level ( level, which is rejected decisively in Table I . The LSF-i predictions, which can be found in Binswanger (I978), are sharper than those of the safety principle but less sharp than the LSF-2 predictions. The implied distributions of target incomes are again inconsistent across game scales. Therefore none of the safety-based rules in terms of gains and losses is consistent with the behaviour of the majority of respondents in the sample.
Income Targets or Income Integration
To integrate the probability distribution of the new prospects with the preexisting income stream requires that the analyst have information about the (presumably subjective) probability distribution of the individual's income. Such information is not available for the sample, and we need to proceed in a more indirect manner to arrive at predictions. The basic feature of the final cumulative probability functions FO to FE is that they, cross each other before or when they reach P = I/2. Without income integration, the safety-fixed rule implies choice of alternative 0 in all cases where P* < I/2. But with income integration, the choice depends on target probabilities. When these are very low, the riskless alternatives will be chosen. As they rise, the choice shifts to more and more risky alternatives. I am unable to derive predictions about the behaviour of individuals for any of the game levels. Hence, the rule cannot be falsified by the present experiment. A new experiment that could falsify it would have to elicit personal probability targets and personal probability distributions of overall income. Because eliciting certainty equivalents by interview is difficult (see Binswanger, I980), the prospects either for falsification or for support of this model are not good.
Good-luck H
To consider the other rules, we neglect the discrete nature of the choices.' In Fig. 2 
where h refers to the density functions (with values greater than or equal to zero). This implies that, at a given target income D*, the probability of not reaching the target will fall for each alternative 0 to F as the game level rises. Furthermore, any alternative that satisfies the constraint at a low game level must also do so at every higher level. If an individual, for example, chooses alternative C at the Rs. 0.50 level because it maximises expected income over that set, the individual cannot, at a higher game level, move to a less risky alternative 0, A, or B (since C will not leave the set of alternatives which satisfies the safety constraint). If alternatives 0 and A are not members of that set at the Rs. 0.50 level but become so at higher levels, the maximisation of expected income would still imply choice C. On the other hand, additions of alternative E or F, at higher g-ame levels, to the set that satisfy the safety constraint would result in a switch from C to E or to F at these levels. This means that we should observe a shift in the distribution toward risk neutrality as the game level rises.' Yet the trend in the experimental results is a statistically significant movement away from the risk-neutral choices. Thus, the evidence is inconsistent with both lexicographic rules.
IV. DISCUSSION
Several security-based models of behaviour under risk have been shown to predict results with respect to simple decision making that are inconsistent with the experimental evidence from a large-scale experiment. The only security-based models that are not inconsistent with the experimental evidence are the safety-fixed model with income integration and the safety principle with income integration (although the latter is also inconsistent when target incomes have a physiological-need interpretation). The reason for the survival of these two models is that they offer no prediction whatsoever unless personal probability targets (or income targets), and the subjective probability distribution of initial income, and its derivatives, are known. For the analyst these models are far from being less complicated than utility-based models, and until their advocates propose ways of measuring the necessary elements the models cannot be operational. One might object that the experiment discussed in this paper is not a good test because it does not subject the individual to losses. But such an objection can logically be made only for safety-based rules in gains and losses, since income integration implies that all opportunity losses are real losses. But the gains and loss rules are quite clearly rejected. Furthermore, we have shown elsewhere that, when people were given the money for a game one day in advance and thus had to bring it back in order to play and put it at risk, their decisions did not differ statistically from the ones they made when payouts were given only after a game was played (Binswanger 1980 Tests concerning utility-based models were confined, by the nature of the experiment, to issues concerning utility functions. We find (i) decreasing absolute risk aversion; (2) increasing partial risk aversion; and (3) declining rather than increasing relative risk aversion as hypothesised by Arrow. However, the latter finding, as we have discussed, is not a rejection of utility theory but of an ad hoc assumption by Arrow.
The major finding with respect to utility models is that the assumption of asset integration is inconsistent with the experimental evidence reported, as well as with experimental evidence involving hypothetical questions reported by Kahneman and Tversky (I979). As Markowitz (I952) has hypothesised, decision makers apparently do not evaluate utilities of final wealth states but of changes in wealth, that is, utilities of gains and losses.' As Kahneman and Tversky (I979) point out, rejection of asset (or income) integration opens the possibility that new prospects may be evaluated in different ways, depending on the reference point with respect to which a decision maker assesses the prospects. In certain situations this may lead to decisions that are inconsistent with some of the axioms of behaviour on which the subjective expected utility models of statistics and economics rest. Furthermore, since the experiment reported here was played only with positive payoffs, we cannot infer from this game the shape of the utility function for losses. We could have done this if asset integration had been accepted.
On the other hand, lack of asset integration does not severely restrict our ability to derive comparative static predictions of behaviour under risk. First, we have the important finding that, at higher than trival payoffs levels, partial risk aversion of all individuals is concentrated in a narrow range and is fairly constant. In many instances the use of an average partial risk aversion (or narrow lower and upper bounds) will be sufficient to predict behaviour accurately regardless of the wealth levels of the individuals.
Furthermore, if one is also interested in the effects of minor variations in risk aversion that are associated with wealth, not only does the experiment give estimates of partial risk aversion at different game levels but the regression results indicate how partial risk aversion changes as wealth rises. 1 The finding of declining relative risk aversion and the rejection of asset integration (or stability of the utility function over time) are intimately related and rest on the fact that the observed behaviour of individuals at low game levels is extremely cautious relative to their assets. Consider the individual choosing game B at the Rs. 5-00 level, with low and high outcomes of Rs. 4 and 12. Alternative A, on the other hand, would give the individual Rs. 3.oo and Rs. I5.oo. The individual is unwilling to risk a loss of Rs. i.oo with 50% probability in order to increase his expected income by Rs. i.oo. If the individual's wealth is Rs. io,ooo (close to the mode in the sample), then the loss with 50 % probability is only i / i ooooth of his or her wealth. Choosing the same alternative at the Rs. 500 level implies a much higher risk relative to wealth. Stated otherwise, the curvature of the gains branch of the utility function is much larger at low levels of games than at high levels.
